Introduction
Germany's privately-held medium size companies have been a source of much envy and mystery.
They have been a driving force behind the German miracle of the 1950's and 60's. In the mid 1990's the competitive strength of these 'Hidden Champions' featured in a high profile study by Hermann Simon, a German strategy expert. 1 In the new millennium, they continue their leadership as we will document in this paper. What are the secrets of success of these comparatively small, but globally competitive firms?
These firms prosper despite Germany's low economic growth of annually 2.1% over the decade [1994] [1995] [1996] [1997] [1998] [1999] [2000] [2001] [2002] [2003] [2004] . The German Economy has been called the "Sick Man of Europe" due to slow growth, an aging workforce, high unemployment, overregulated labor markets and high labors cost. Some leading economists 2 and business leaders have all but written off Germany as a location for business. For instance, the president of GM Europe once described his strategic options as "Out of Germany or Out of Business". 3 Yet, this bleak performance is largely driven by sluggish domestic demand and declining investments. German exports are rising at a time when most other advanced economies loose export market shares to emerging economies in Asia and Eastern Europe. An influential French policy study thus named German companies along with Chinese companies as the winners of globalization. 4 This success even defies a strong Euro, which is making 'Made in Germany' expensive on world markets. Collectively, German businesses have generated an trade surplus in 2006 of over US$ 200 billion, which puts them ahead even of China and Japan -let alone the USA, who report a trade deficit of over US$ 825 or 6.5% of GDP ( Figure 1 ). The export is driven not only by large and well-known companies like Volkswagen, BASF and Siemens, but by many small-and medium-size enterprises (SMEs). Over 340,000
German companies export, and over 100,000 companies have some form of direct investment abroad. We estimate that SMEs with annual revenues of less than € 1 billion account for about 40% of all German manufactured goods exports. However, not only German SMEs are prospering in global markets, similar success stories have been in large countries like the USA 6 and small countries such as Denmark. 7 We start from the work of Hermann Simon, who identified over 450 'Hidden Champions' in the early 1990s, and analyzed over 200 in detail. 8 These companies occupy global leadership positions despite their small size. We investigate the long-term evidence of their leadership by revisiting Simon's set of firms and trace their development and strategies over a period of ten years.
Most of these companies are family-owned and based in small towns, yet they hold market shares of up to 90% in worldwide markets niches. Hauni (cigarette machines), Webasto (sunroofs and auxiliary heating systems for cars), or Dorma (door control hardware and systems; moveable walls) may not be household names, but they are leading global competitors in their respective industries.
We identify three elements shared by many of the Hidden Champions: First, they exploit the opportunities of private ownership by creating organizational cultures and practices that build on owner-entrepreneurs, and long-term relationships within the firm and with key external partners. Second, they concentrate their often limited resources on niche market segments that they can dominate worldwide. Their competitive positions are grounded in technology-based product leadership and close customer relationships. Third, they strive for operational effectiveness, continuously assimilating, attaining, and extending best practices.
We investigate the Hidden Champions using our database of Simon's firms, in combination with insights from three recent studies of German companies with similar characteristics. 9 As the name suggests, these companies are typically unknown outside their niches, mostly because they are private and relish their obscurity. German business law until recently made it relatively easy for companies to keep even basic data confidential. 10 Our multisource multi-method approach aims to update our knowledge of these firms, and to relate Simon's popular work 11 to contemporary strategy research.
The next section presents the evidence on German 'Hidden Champions': How did they develop over the past decade, and where do they stand today? We then proceed to discuss the strategies and practices of these firms. A case study of Alfred Kaercher illustrates the development of a world market leader in cleaning systems. We conclude with lessons for sustained success of medium-size firms.
Hidden Champions: Then and Now
The German word "Mittelstand" refers to a broad category of SMEs in private ownership.
These companies usually share positive attributes like a certain nimbleness, long-term thinking, and concern for the interests of multiple stakeholders, including employees, suppliers and the regional communities in which they are based.
Official statistics suggest that SMEs with less than 500 employees and an annual turnover of less than € 50 million account for more than 99% of all German companies; they provide about 70% of employment in the private sector and create about 40% of turnover. 12 Simon uses a broader definition of Hidden Champions that incorporates qualitative aspects and a higher revenue limit:
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• First, they must occupy the number 1 or number 2 position in their world market, or the number 1 position in the European market.
• Second, they should not generate more than circa €800 million (DM1.5 billion). The median firm in Simon's sample had revenues of about €100 million, and exported slightly over 50% of its sales. Two thirds of the companies generated revenues over €50 million.
The revenues of four percent of them exceeded €800 million; yet they were included because they displayed characteristics typical for Hidden Champions.
• Third, a Hidden Champion had to have low public visibility.
The Hidden Champions are distinct from both small, mainly domestic family-owned businesses, and from large publicly-listed multinational companies. Many of them are large companies by most common statistical definitions, yet their private ownership, governance structure and organizational culture resembles SMEs. 
Their leaders are very strong and stay at the helm for decades.

Business Strategies for the Global Economy
Simon proposed ten lessons from his study of the Hidden Champions Governance and management practices: "enlighted family capitalism"
Most Hidden Champions are privately owned, which shapes their organizational culture, and lays the basis for long-term development of business strategies. 23 German medium-size privately-held companies use distinct governance and management processes ("family capitalism") that contrast with publicly-listed companies run by external managers in the interest of anonymous shareholders:
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• The principal-agent problems typical for large public corporations do not arise if capitalmajority and management are united either in one person or shared by family members. If external management is employed, the family keeps in most cases an important oversight role.
• The organizational structure is typically based on flat hierarchies and informal channels of communication following the personal style of the owner. Management and employees cultivate a high degree of mutual trust and loyalty, leading to an implicit "life-long"
contract. This is reinforced by embeddedness in local communities in which the firms are located.
• In consequence, the corporate culture tends to resemble an "extended family" with patriarchal features and strong internal cohesion. Strategic and operational independence are highly valued, which leads to a preference for self-financing, and thus indirectly to a culture of frugality. Long job tenures are common at all levels, yet unions are not welcome, and co-determination is avoided or impeded. Plant-level works councils exist as required by German law, yet they focus on company-specific employee concerns, while minimizing external trade-union influence.
• Owners are often emotionally attached to their firm, which is typically an integral part of their self-fulfillment and the family tradition, rather than 'just' a financial investment.
Their raison d'etre is thus not only to maximize profits but to secure the company's existence for the next generations. Firms are designed to stay independent and to achieve multigenerational continuity.
The continuity of ownership and the absence of stock-market driven short-term financial pressures create a supportive environment for continuity of strategy. It allows the development of unique skills and assets, and it establishes a clear identity with customers, channels, and other outside entities, while strengthening the fit across the value chain.
However, family-owned companies face unique challenges, most notably with respect to intergenerational transfer of ownership and leadership within the family. A recent study of management practices comparing medium-size manufacturing firms in the USA, UK, France and Germany suggests that "primo geniture family firms"-those that pass management on to the eldest son -are significantly less well managed than those managed by the founder or by outside professional managers. 25 Family firms that appoint professional external managers or chose the best manager from within the family were better managed. The study shows that German family firms are considerably more likely to employ outside professional managers in leadership positions than companies in the other countries analyzed (Figure 4 ).
Family ownership with professional management may thus combine the best of two worlds: family control ensures long-term investment horizon and a balanced stakeholder philosophy, while state-of-the-art management practices contributed by professional managers. (a) the firm offers differentiated products and services, appealing to a particular segment of customers and (b) the value chain that best serves the target segment differs from that of other industry segments. 27 Most of the Hidden Champions have developed their specialization continuously, while some have restructured their portfolio to shift from domestic diversification to a global specialist strategy, a phenomenon known as 'globalfocusing'. 28 In their niche, they can isolate themselves from competition by serving the special needs of a very narrowly defined target segment. They may attain a temporary "quasi-monopoly", though markets are typically 'contestable': substitute products are available, and new competitors can be expected to enter the niche if it becomes sufficiently profitable for them. 29 In addition to continuously striving to improve their differentiated products and services, niche companies must therefore monitor their cost base to stay price competitive.
Scholars have taken limited interest in global niche players, despite their economic importance. 30 Globalization has enhanced their opportunities: the opening of markets has lead to an increase in product variety, while the historical disadvantages in terms of economies of scale can be overcome through global leveraging of costs across geographic markets. Moreover, the technological changes that fostered globalization create new opportunities for niche players:
• New transportation technologies substantially lower the costs, and increase the speed and reliability of sea fright and air transport; thus enhancing global product market access and creating new opportunities for outsourcing parts of the value chain.
• Innovations in telecommunication and information technology facilitate global transactions and communications by reducing telecommunications cost to virtually zero, and increasing the ability to process the transmitted information. This enables even small firms to manage transnational production and sales networks. In addition, flexible manufacturing technologies and practices reduce minimum efficient scale requirements in many industries. 31 Hidden Champions are typically positioned as "value leaders", combining superior quality of products and services with a careful attention to customer needs. 32 Many businesses may subscribe to such a positioning, yet the Hidden Champions back this strategy up with major resource commitments in R&D, sales and distribution:
Simon emphasized R&D-led innovation as an element of the strategies pursued by Another pillar of the strategies of the Hidden Champion is their commitment to customer needs. They typically sell their products and provide customer service and training through wholly-owned distribution channels. 38 Rather than contracting out, Hidden Champions typically operate these networks themselves to ensure both quality of service and close customer contact.
This control over the value chain allows feeding knowledge from and about consumers into the process of continuous innovation supporting innovations that are incremental rather than disruptive. This innovation strategy requires deep knowledge of customers' needs, which is generated through direct customer contact. • Serving multiple geographic markets from one production site permits MNEs to realize greater economies of scale in production.
• Global supply chains enable MNEs to take advantage of comparative cost advantages at different locations.
• Global distribution networks permit MNEs to serve global business customers requiring delivery of the same product at multiple sites around the world.
• Multiple research and development sites allow MNEs to tap into local knowledge clusters in different parts of the world.
• Exchange of operational experiences from one country to another may enhance the overall efficiency of each operation.
Global niche market leadership based on technology-driven products and global sales and service networks is thus a common characteristic of Hidden Champions. They build on competences specific to an industry but transferable and competitive on a global stage. Their strategies are implemented through persistent focus on efficiency.
Operational effectiveness: "Firing on all cylinders"
Targeting a global niche is an ambitious strategy for comparatively small firms. They The overriding governance principle has been that company interests dominate over family considerations. This philosophy was reflected in the transfer of management responsibilities to non-family members, as Mrs. Kaercher recognized her own limitations. Her leadership was however crucial at a critical juncture in the history of the company: she took control back from the first outside CEO, and placed her trust into a young leadership team.
Most profits are kept in the company. Since Kaercher is privately held by the two children of the founder, it does not have to publish financial results. The growth has been mainly self-financed, supported by bank financing. The company is non-union and is also not member of an employers association. It is therefore not bound by the collective bargaining agreements and has more flexibility in negotiating wage and working time arrangements. Teamwork is stressed as a core value; special Kaercher events and family days help to create an "extended family feeling".
Sick days and fluctuation are said to be much lower than at comparable companies. All German operations are located in small communities in Baden-Wuerttemberg, which helps to create and retain a loyal and dedicated workforce. Management is mostly recruited internally. All employees participate in a compensation schemes that are tied to business performance.
Global niche market leadership: solving complex cleaning needs worldwide
Roland Kamm, who became CEO in 1974, was inspired by an unconventional German management thinker, Wolfgang Mewes, who promoted a "bottleneck-focused strategy" (Engpass konzentrierte Strategie = EKS). 51 Essentially, EKS suggests that the key to success is to concentrate all resources, however limited, to solve a specific "burning problem" (the bottleneck) for a well-defined customer group.
In addition, Mewes advised companies to shift their objectives from profit maximization to maximize their "power of attraction" for their target group. Profit is not the objective, but rather the result of these efforts. Instead of trying to achieve maximum profits, companies should create maximum benefits for a target group, solving their most burning problems better than any competitor. Since most companies he worked with, were small and had limited resources, Mewes advised them to select specific segments of the market by building on their own strengths and avoid blindly imitating perceived leaders. Based on its own resource profile the company should analyze which specific customer problem it can solve best, and find a customer segment that matches its available resources. Successfully solving this problem would then create a "success spiral": A supplier's rising attraction for its target group would raise sales, and correspondingly profits, which can be reinvested to create even more powerful solutions. Since niches are typically small and subject to changing market demand, Mewes recommends focusing on the underlying fundamental needs that persist even when specific products and techniques to fulfill these needs become obsolete. . cleaning needs on a very fine-grained level. 54 For example, the cleaning need of each type of vehicle was analyzed by talking directly to customers: How was the cleaning done? What were the most "burning problems"? Based on this analysis, products are developed for specific target customer segments.
New product development is thus a key element of Kaercher's strategy. The "customerdriven innovation routine" has become ingrained in the organizational culture, and illustrates a key trait of Hidden Champions. Kaercher probably knows much more than its customers about cleaning problems. This know-how is based on intellectual property accumulated over thirty years, and continuously developed further. The company holds more than 300 patents and files 30 to 40 new patents per year. Innovation is mostly incremental but leads in some cases to major customer benefits: for instance a redesigned turbo/rotary nozzle increased the cleaning efficiency of building surfaces and roads by a factor of five. 55 This accumulated know how, and its continuous development, enable Kaercher to defend its leadership position.
Operational effectiveness: world class in key processes
Typical for a Hidden Champion, Kaercher started to internalize early. Even before its strategic reorientation in the 1970s, the company had operations in Austria, Switzerland and Many of Kaercher's products are under pressure from Asian low-cost producers, while the success has attracted larger competitors into their market. Kaercher therefore has to be a low cost producer in the industry and remain price competitive in addition to being innovative and customer-centric to provide unique products and services.
Kaercher still manufactures about 50% of its worldwide production in Germany, while
Germany accounts for about 20% of its revenues. 57 The company has four of its largest factories in Germany, employing about 1,250 people, with other plants located in Italy (3), USA (3), Mexico, Brazil and China. How can they compete in view of German labor costs being amongst the highest in the world? Several factors contribute to the competitiveness of their German plants:
• The Kaercher product range is fairly complex, ranging from high volume consumer products to sophisticated small series of large professional cleaning equipment. All products are continually improved, such that proximity between production and R&D, which is mostly in Germany, is crucial.
• This complex product range requires a high degree of flexibility. Moreover, seasonal variations in the demand for consumer products require flexible responses. Kaercher created its own production system to manage these demands, the "KaercherProduktionssystem" (KPS) modeled after the Toyota system. All products are built to order. Several hundred temporary workers are employed to cover seasonal variations.
Factories are segmented into lines focusing on specific product types: within each line, employees can substitute for another, which substantially enhances flexibility.
• Factories focus each on one of the major product groups producing mainly on a world scale, therefore achieving substantial economies of scale.
Kaercher has from the start of its rapid expansion strategy worked with outside suppliers.
It therefore differs from many Hidden Champion, who have a 'deep' value chain and do not outsource extensively. Kaercher's decision to outsource was to a large degree driven be necessity, since resources were limited. Suppliers were needed to jointly develop new products and to share the high investments for new production equipment. Components are to a high degree outsourced:
about 70% of the production value is bought in. We estimate that manufacturing labor costs for large series products thus are only between 10% and 15% of total cost.
However, the company has decided against total outsourcing and is keeping most of the final assembly of its products in house. It is constantly reviewing the mix of parts outsourced but keeps strategically relevant parts (e.g. nozzles) in-house. In addition, the company strives to keep all key production technologies at least to a small degree in-house to be able to competently negotiate with outside suppliers.
The case of Kaercher illustrates many of the features that our wider investigations suggest are typical for German Hidden Champions: family ownership combined with professional management provides the basis for a long-term strategy focused on global niche leadership.
Market leadership is based on a constant stream of innovative products and services solving complex cleaning problems. Products and processes are continuously improved by taking advantage of the global footprint of the operations and the relentless drive for efficiency in the core R&D and production sites in Germany.
Conclusions
In recent years, international business researchers and business leaders have, for good reasons, focused on the consequences of the emergence of new players such as Russia 58 and
China on the global stage. Yet, it is time to look at the old industrial powerhouses such as Germany again, as they have rejuvenated and continue as major players on world markets.
We have studied a particularly interesting group of German companies, coined 'Hidden Champions' by Hermann Simon. These companies produced many success stories, thus providing positive outliers and hopefully valuable lessons for management practice in Germany in beyond.
With some simplification, we can summarize their management model as follows:
• Family ownership and cooperative corporate cultures combined with outside professional management,
• Global market dominance through positioning in niche markets, and thus exploiting and enhancing resources and capabilities on a global scale,
• Continuous endeavor to raise operational effectiveness of all major processes and functions.
Many of these lessons from Hidden Champions are relevant beyond Germany. Companies with similar characteristics can be found in several other countries. 59 An interesting area to explore in future research is that globalization creates favorable conditions for these mid size companies.
These "global medium enterprises" are positioned between the widely researched big publiclylisted multinationals and the traditional privately-held domestically-focused SMEs.
However, the preponderance of such firms in Germany almost certainly has roots in the specific nature of German capitalism as well. The Germany economic system has been characterized, as 'coordinated market economy' as economic agents to a large extend rely on long term relationship. 60 Future research may beneficially explore these linkages between the structural features of the economic system and the types of competitive advantages of firm originating from a country, as we have illustrated here for the case of Germany. For example, how does the German education system, with a strong traditional emphasis on vocational training and long company tenures, foster the development of highly specialized capabilities? How do applied research institutes, such as the Frauenhofer Institute, facilitate the transfer of scientific research into innovative products and services?
Appendix: Database and Methodology
The original work of Simon is based on a group of over 500 companies he identified as world market leader. 61 Since they were by definition "hidden" and in many cases relished their obscurity, he did not claim that these companies, identified through various unconventional sources like newspaper articles or chance encounters, represented all of the hidden champions, the were only the "tip of the iceberg". In addition, financial information on these companies was extremely difficult to find. Simon interviewed more than 100 companies personally. In addition he utilized 122 questionnaires administered as part of a PhD dissertation written under his supervision 62 (the questionnaire had been sent to 457 companies). Drawing on these sources, he mentioned 220 Hidden Champions by name in the book. These 220 companies form our base population.
We verified basic information like revenues and number of employees for the original date of the research, mostly the year 1994, since this quantitative information was reported only for a smaller number of these companies in the book. Then we analyzed these companies 10 years later. All companies, except for one, could still be identified In total, revenue and employee numbers could be generated for 141 companies, covering both the first year 1994 and the second year 2004. In several instances, when only employee numbers were available for one of these two years, revenues were estimated based on average revenue per employee of other sample companies. To keep data sources consistent, the Hoppenstedt Handbuch der Großunternehmen 63 was used as main source for both time periods. Our data gathering led to somewhat different results in several aggregate numbers, especially in a higher median revenue of about €120 million compared Simons' median revenue of about 100 million € and a higher mean revenue of about €290 million compared to €255 million. Since information on the smaller companies was much more difficult to get than on the larger ones, this certainly biases our results somewhat towards the larger companies.
In addition to this quantitative comparison, each company's world market position and selling and manufacturing network was analyzed in detail, using again publicly available information. The focus of this work stream was to determine, if the company was able to keep or extend its position or lost its world market leadership. In addition, two research assistants independently assessed the potential reasons for these developments based on public information on company homepages as well as independent sources, if available, like press reports or industry analysis (double-blind approach). Their independent assessments were then combined by the lead author overseeing the research to a summary assessment.
